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It is widely acknowledged that trust is a vital com-ponent of and basis for relationships between clin-icians and patients. These interpersonal trust rela-
tionships have moral content—fidelity to trust is
morally praiseworthy, betrayal of trust morally
blameworthy.1 The need for trust and reliance on
trust are especially important in health care because
of patients’ acute vulnerability to suffering, lost op-
portunity, and lack of power. Patients’ vulnerability
to organizations is arguably even greater than to
physicians, yet while physicians acknowledge conse-
quent ethical obligations, most institutional obliga-
tions are couched in contractual terms. This contract
model assumes a level playing field for its parties,
even though most would agree that “consumer sover-
eignty” is far from the norm in the health care mar-
ketplace.
My aim in this paper is to describe the relation-
ship between individuals and health care institutions,
using trust as a conceptual framework, then to draw
conclusions for the ethics of health care organiza-
tions. In the last section, I will discuss what condi-
tions or circumstances could influence trust in health
care institutions, and contrast them with conditions
that influence trustworthiness. It is my belief that a
sociological understanding of institutional trust pro-
vides insight into the relationships between individu-
als and health care institutions and hence the moral-
ity of organizational actions.
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Though trust is essential to relationships between people, including that between patient and
clinician, its role in organizational ethics is largely unexplored. Nonetheless, trust is also ideally a part
of the relationship between patient and health care institution, both because it is desirable in and of
itself, and because it makes for better medical care.
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Can an Organization Be
Ethical?
Since organizations do not clearlyhave the same sort of “moral
agency” attributed to people, philoso-
phers have debated whether they
have any intrinsic moral obligations.
Most philosophers and organization-
al theorists agree, however, that orga-
nizations have an identity distinct
from the sum of the individuals with-
in them, and thus can be treated as
moral actors.2
There is no question that organi-
zations are dominant actors in mod-
ern society. Organizations expand
our abilities in ways that allow com-
mon people to do uncommon things:
a trauma center is able to achieve
what no individual, no matter how
skilled or talented, could hope to ac-
complish. As dominant actors in
health care, organizations merit our
moral attention for several reasons.
First, they create role expectations
that have moral content. For exam-
ple, nurses and physicians in a trau-
ma center are expected to be patient
advocates, and the center’s adminis-
trator is expected to engineer the sys-
tem so as to maximize efficiency. Or-
ganizations shape behavior through
these role expectations, and through
their policies, practices, and culture.
Nurses have traditionally been grant-
ed less authority than physicians, for
instance, but their authority varies
across different types of organiza-
tions.
In addition to creating role expec-
tations, organizations as actors re-
spond to social conditions.3 Hospi-
tals, physician groups, and insurers,
for instance, respond to the medical
marketplace with utilization review,
prices, and changes in benefits. Final-
ly, organizations have a normative
structure. They set goals and express
values and norms in addition to cre-
ating role expectations.4 In health
care, changes in organizations,
changes in delivery and financing
arrangements, changes in the context
of care, change the experiences of
health care for individual patients, in-
cluding which and how much care
they receive, when they receive it, and
how it is received. Organizational de-
cisions also affect potential future pa-
tients, employees, other organiza-
tions, and the community. Given the
dominant place of organizations in
modern society, and in particular the
change occurring in health care orga-
nizations, it behooves scholars to ex-
amine the ethics of health care orga-
nizations. What framework, what
theory of right behavior, can be used
to examine organizational ethics in
health care?
Interpersonal Trust in Health
Care
Theories and principles ofbioethics rely to varying degrees
on intrinsic or instrumental justifica-
tions for imposing moral duties on
clinicians. An intrinsic justification is
one that asserts the value of ethics as
an end in itself because of the basic
and fundamental importance of
maintaining morality. An instrumen-
tal justification is one that sees moral
injunctions as serving a useful pur-
pose, usually one that promotes a
more objective aspect of social wel-
fare. Classic moral injunctions
against lying, stealing, or killing, for
instance, can be justified in either
manner.
There are certain intrinsic and
universal aspects of the clinician-
patient relationship that warrant a
strong ethical code. Patients typically
encounter clinicians in a state of great
stress and vulnerability in which they
depend on the clinician’s greatly su-
perior skill and knowledge. In these
circumstances, trust is an essential
and prevalent attribute of the rela-
tionship.5 Trusting relationships can
be valued in and of themselves, and
have an inherently moral compo-
nent.6 Thus clinical ethics rightly fo-
cuses on establishing the elements of
trustworthiness that are essential to
deserving trust.
Trust is not simply an end in itself;
it is also necessary to achieve the ends
of medicine. Trust is essential in order
for patients to submit to examination
and treatment, to reveal sensitive in-
formation, to follow treatment rec-
ommendations, and to adhere to
treatment regimens. For both intrin-
sic and instrumental reasons, then, a
primary objective of medical ethics is
to maintain the conditions necessary
to preserve trust, avoid abuses of




If institutional ethics were simply aderivative of clinical ethics, it could
be constructed by means of instru-
mental justifications, simply by as-
serting that the role of health care in-
stitutional ethics is to support the
functioning of clinicians. Institution-
al ethics would then prescribe what-
ever is necessary to promote and sus-
tain the moral aspects of health care
professionals’ work, such as helping
to guard the confidentiality of med-
ical records. This perspective is evi-
dent in much of the literature 
addressing the ethics for health care
administrators.7 This literature also
addresses conflicts between the self-
interest of a manager and the goals or
mission of the institution, and the in-
teraction between clinical ethics and
conventional business ethics (which
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Given the dominant place of organizations in modern
society, and in particular the change occurring in
health care organizations, it behooves scholars to 
examine the ethics of health care organizations.
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is concerned with such issues as fair
competition and honesty in advertis-
ing). The resulting moral framework
is aimed primarily at individual ad-
ministrators within institutions, and
so does not fully consider the organi-
zation itself as a moral actor in soci-
ety.
Merely transplanting the ethics of
commercial transactions into the
health care arena is plainly not
enough,8 in spite of the fact that
health care business ethics often rec-
ognizes a distinct institutional per-
spective.9 An ethics for health care
organizations needs a framework that
is different from either individual
clinicians, individual administrators,
or collective commercial enterprises.
Health care, or at least health, is a
primary good. It is necessary to
achieve one’s life goals and con-
tributes to equality of opportunity.10
In addition, the sick are emotionally
and physically vulnerable. Imbal-
ances of knowledge and power,
which contribute to this vulnerabili-
ty, are present in health care relation-
ships to a greater extent than they are
in other arenas.11 Health care occu-
pies a central role during times when
individuals confront physical weak-
ness, suffering, death, and birth.
These are life events with profound,
even spiritual meaning. Most rele-
vant for health care organizations,
the provision of health care invari-
ably relies on pooled resources. The
burdens and benefits of health care
are distributed among a population
of individuals so that both one’s
health and the resources to meet
health care needs are entrusted to
health care organizations.
The basis for an adequate moral
theory of health care organizations is
thus more appropriately grounded in
their relations. Such an approach is a
limited form of role morality—that
is, of an approach to morality that
addresses the roles that actors have
assumed or been assigned. In the case
of institutions, roles are typically de-
fined either by contract or by social
expectations, including but not lim-
ited to those imposed by regulation.
Health care institutions, as busi-
nesses in a market-based system,
have tended to characterize their rela-
tionships as contractual obligations
rather than on what the law regards
as “fiduciary responsibility.”12 For in-
stance, an insurer, rather than seeing
itself as a trustee of pooled resources
for which it has a moral obligation to
make good decisions about what is
covered under a broad, discretionary
standard, tends to specify in its con-
tract as precisely as possible what is
and is not covered and under what
circumstances. Even so, language
such as “medically necessary” or “ex-
perimental” requires interpretation
in its application to coverage deci-
sions.13 This contractual model of in-
dividual-institutional relationships
emphasizes honesty (or promise
keeping), fair competition, and other
conventional business mores.
The contractual model is grossly
inadequate for health care institu-
tions, however, because the relation-
ships are not between equals. In the
selection of health insurance, for in-
stance, it would be a stretch to char-
acterize consumers as informed and
imaginative, having multiple options
and free exit.14 Medical decisions in
particular are made under conditions
of uncertainty and risk that place the
“consumer” in an especially vulnera-
ble position. In addition, unlike typ-
ical business-consumer relationships,
the purchaser of health care is not the
consumer. Rather, employers and
government purchase health insur-
ance (which then purchases health
care) and therefore determine what
products are available. Health care
organizations are accountable not
just to patients but also to pur-
chasers, stockholders (or other
sources of capital such as banks or
contributors), future and potential
patients, and the community. These
conflicts in accountability further di-
lute the protections that might nor-
mally exist in a typical bilateral con-
tract between business and customer.
Control or Trust?
Enforcing ethical behavior is oneway to manage this complexity
and guard against abuse. Enforce-
ment could take a variety of forms.
For example, extensive monitoring
or regulation, and to a lesser extent
contracts, can substitute for trust,
and to a considerable extent, in fact,
society has chosen monitoring over
trust for health care organizations.
Government regulation and legal lia-
bility impose numerous types of
oversight on hospitals, insurers, and
health maintenance organizations,
for instance, and many more, such as
the Managed Care Bill of Rights for
Consumers Act of 2001, are current-
ly being debated (H.R. 2497). In
these regimes, institutional morality
then tends to consist of complying
with the rules set by contract or im-
posed by government. Both contrac-
tual specification of duties and exter-
nal monitoring through regulation,
however, are costly and imperfect
means of protecting patients.
Another way to reduce the poten-
tial for abuse through enforcement
is to reduce the scope of the institu-
tion’s relationship with patients or
the degree of patients’ vulnerability.
Health plans’ discretion over cover-
age decisions could be limited, for
instance, or the financial incentives
they use to affect treatment decisions
could be moderated. These limits
also have costs, however, since they
may restrict organizational innova-
tion and the ability to improve effi-
ciency or quality.
Enforcement is not the only
method for managing the complex
relationship between health care or-
ganizations and the people affected
by them, however. Self-regulation
provides a less costly and potentially
more beneficial form of protection.
Either individually or collectively,
that is, health care institutions could
guard against their own potential to
abuse their relationships with pa-
tients by means of self-imposed and
self-policed norms of behavior.
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Self-regulation invokes trust.15 In-
stitutions in effect say “trust us be-
cause . . .,” where the reasons for trust
are specified in institutionalized ele-
ments of trustworthiness, such as loy-
alty, caring, honesty, competence,
confidentiality, and fairness. A moral
institution is one that adheres to the
standards of trustworthiness that it
establishes for itself or that are neces-
sary to justify the level of trust it
claims for itself. These ethical stan-
dards are not externally imposed, and
they are not necessarily inherent or
universal (although some certainly
are, such as honesty and compe-
tence). Trust in this construct is an al-
ternative to the states of distrust or
suspicion that give rise to more regu-
latory regimes. Trust is also an alter-
native or supplement to arms-length
contractual relations that are charac-
terized not so much by distrust as by
a diminished level of trust, in which
each party looks after its own interests
and the standards of conduct take on
a more specified and legal character.
Because trust is an alternative to these
regimes, it is less mandatory for insti-
tutions than for physicians. Once in-
stitutions invoke trust, they give rise
to a set of ethical obligations or ob-
jectives to establish trustworthiness
and earn trust.16 In short, institutions
that invoke trust assume a role-based
ethic that is grounded in trustworthi-
ness.
It is not necessary, or even desir-
able, to disassemble or avoid regula-
tion, monitoring, or contracts com-
pletely to invoke a trust-based ethics
for organizations. On the contrary,
regulation and monitoring mecha-
nisms can strengthen trust, since they
deter untrustworthy behavior, and
enhance the trusting party’s expecta-
tions. However, higher levels of trust
can help avoid the high costs of
greater monitoring.17
Proposing a role morality based in
trust is only the beginning of the in-
quiry, however. Where it may lead de-
pends entirely on the circumstances
and structures of different institu-
tions. The results cannot be patterned
automatically after interpersonal trust
between clinicians and patients, since
organizations are by nature more
complex and multidimensional. In-
stead, a role-based or function-based
morality that focuses on relationships
acknowledges the differences between
types of organizations and even be-
tween different roles within one orga-
nization. Patients seeking care are not
the only individuals with relation-
ships to health care institutions. Po-
tential patients, a group practice’s
panel, or insurer’s enrollees, for in-
stance, are other interested parties
whose relationship with the organiza-
tion needs to be clarified and exam-
ined. A hospital or nursing home is
primarily a provider of health care
services, and an indemnity insurer
primarily a payer for health care, but
a managed care organization or a cap-
itated group practice is both provider
and payer. A single organization may
even be a patient’s provider, insurer,
and employer. All organizations are
employers and members of commu-
nities.
Just as our expectations for what
an adult should do for a child vary ac-
cording to whether the adult is par-
ent, teacher, doctor, neighbor, or a
stranger, our expectations of an orga-
nization may depend on whether it is,
for the purposes of judging the
morality of actions, employer,
provider, payer, or some combina-
tion. Bioethics has traditionally tend-
ed to the individualistic and the pre-
sent, addressing what should be done
in this case at this time. For those or-
ganizations that must balance the
needs and claims of individuals and
collectives, including future patients,
a sole focus on the present individual
is inappropriate.18
What is Trust?
Institutional trust is the subject of agrowing literature grounded in or-
ganizational theory, psychology, and
sociology. We can also learn a great
deal about institutional trust from the
literature on interpersonal trust, in
spite of important differences be-
tween the two sorts. In health care, of
course, institutional trust would dif-
fer from that which patients have in
physicians because of the different
roles of physicians and institutions.19
Physicians are providers, for example,
but the provider role is not the only
role assumed by health care organiza-
tions. Organizations also pay for
health care, provide facilities and
equipment, and supervise employees.
According to Diego Gambetta, in-
terpersonal trust is “the specific ex-
pectation that another’s actions will
be beneficial rather than detrimen-
tal.”20 A trust-based relationship is
composed of a number of elements.21
A trust-based relationship presuppos-
es the vulnerability, reliance, and de-
pendence of the truster. As Annette
Baier has written succinctly, “Risk is
of the very essence of trust.”22 In
health care, this vulnerability arises
from the experience of illness, from
the imbalance between physicians’
and patients’ knowledge, from pa-
tients’ lack of power within health
care institutions, and from the very
importance of health and well-being.
Health, well-being, and private in-
formation are the “trust objects”—
what one is being trusted with—in
most interpersonal health care rela-
tionships. For health care organiza-
tions, the objects of trust might also
include financial well-being in the
event of catastrophic illness, liveli-
hood as an employee, or the health of
neighbors and community in addi-
It is not necessary, or even desirable, to disassemble or
avoid regulation, monitoring, or contracts completely
to invoke a trust-based ethics for organizations.
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tion to one’s own. Trust relationships
are also found in conditions where
there is risk and uncertainty in deci-
sionmaking—conditions that are cer-
tainly present in health care.
Trusting parties expect—as speci-
fied in Gambetta’s definition—benef-
icence; that is, they expect that the
trustee will be concerned for their
well-being and interests. Along with
expectations of beneficence are expec-
tations of advocacy—expectations
that the trustee will act on one’s be-
half in negotiations or dealings with
third parties—and expectations of
competence or of good outcomes.
The truster gives the trustee discre-
tionary power over decisions in con-
ditions of risk and uncertainty, and
expects the trustee to use this power
on the truster’s behalf. We are quite
conditioned to thinking about trust
for interpersonal relationships, as be-
tween parent and child, teacher and
student, or doctor and patient, but on
close examination, trust (or distrust)
in institutions is widespread. There is
talk of the American people losing
trust in government. Trust is needed
between suppliers and purchasers of
goods in order to allow the market to
function and within organizations to
allow them to function smoothly and
efficiently. Trust is the grease that
keeps the wheels of society moving at
both individual and organizational
levels.23
How are institutional and inter-
personal trust alike in the context of
health care? First, patients (or poten-
tial patients) are vulnerable to both
individuals and institutions (research
firms, hospitals). Imbalances of
power, particularly of knowledge and
expertise, are unavoidable in both
types of relationships. Conditions of
risk, and what is at stake for vulnera-
ble patients, are equally important.
Uncertainty of outcomes is, likewise,
a feature of interactions with both in-
dividuals and health care institutions.
How does institutional trust differ
from interpersonal trust, besides hav-
ing multiple (and perhaps conflict-
ing) trust objects? First, expectations
of competence might be stronger. In-
dividuals’ errors can be sympatheti-
cally overlooked, whereas institution-
al, and especially institutionalized
error, is more frightening and less for-
givable.24 Second, expectations of
beneficence, and particularly of advo-
cacy, are weaker, because they must be
balanced by institutional fairness. The
importance attached to distributive
and procedural justice and their rela-
tionship, which is absent from most
considerations of an individual’s trust-
worthiness, could be explained by a
trust-based theory of organizations.25
That is, if an organization must dis-
tribute benefits and burdens (health
care costs or job layoffs, for example),
then individuals’ moral judgments
about that distribution depend on
both the outcome (how much she
gets or pays) and the process the insti-
tution followed to determine the dis-
tribution.
What Influences or Justifies
Trust?
We now turn to what justifiestrust, and what conditions pre-
dispose to stronger or weaker trust re-
lationships. There is an important
distinction between influencing (af-
fecting) trust and justifying (observ-
ing or deserving) trust. Some behav-
iors, such as respectful treatment,
both strengthen and justify trust.
Some, like public relations cam-
paigns, affect perceptions and thus in-
crease trust, but do not justify it.
Others, like employing proper steril-
ization techniques, justify but do not
strengthen trust; they are unperceived
by trusters but make the truster more
trustworthy. Finally, actions like de-
ception both undermine trust and
justify distrust.
A necessary criterion and the first
step toward a justified trust-based re-
lationship is acceptance.26 The trustee
organization must accept from the
truster the decisionmaking power and
expectations that come with it. This is
a minimum condition. An individual
who arrives at a bank, puts a big bag
of money on the floor, and leaves,
does not have a trust-based relation-
ship for the safe, productive care of
that money, no matter how much he
says he trusts the bank to take care of
it. Rather, organizations must accept,
usually in an explicit way, their discre-
tionary power over a particular trust
object. With this acceptance, and
only after it, come the moral obliga-
tions that follow from a trust relation-
ship. Hospitals accept a certain power
over private information, for exam-
ple, and given this acceptance there is
a legitimate social expectation that
patient information will be kept con-
fidential by hospital staff, even if the
patient never asked for or demanded
such confidentiality.
It is important to note that inter-
personal and institutional trust are in-
timately related. Trust in an institu-
tion can influence the degree of trust
in individuals who are part of that or-
ganization. Conversely, experiences
with individuals can influence trust in
institutions. For example, trust in the
profession of medicine influences the
trust that individuals have for doc-
tors, even during their first visit. Be-
trayal of trust by a particular physi-
cian, however, can adversely affect
one’s trust of all other physicians, the
profession of medicine, and the orga-
nizations in which that physician
practices. Betrayals of confidences by
employees also make the institution
less trustworthy.27 Similarly, unautho-
rized release of information by health
care organizations may make patients
less likely to entrust private informa-
tion to individuals affiliated with
those organizations.
One of the most important condi-
tions affecting trust is knowledge. In
order to have expectations of benefi-
cence, advocacy, and competence,
knowledge of the trustee’s behavior is
needed. In particular, it is important
for that behavior to be predictable or
reliable. Even if an institution’s behav-
ior is predictably unfavorable in some
ways—it never has adequate parking,
for example—knowing what to ex-
pect is an important condition affect-
ing the ability to trust wisely. Of
course, knowledge of or experience
with actions of beneficence, advocacy,
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competence, and fairness justify and
strengthen trust, whereas bad experi-
ences undermine trust. The powerful
influence of knowledge explains why
the history of a trust-based relation-
ship is important. The longer one has
known an organization or individual,
the more experiences one has had
without surprise or betrayal, the more
the organization is known, the more
trust is likely to exist in that relation-
ship. Reputation, or secondhand ex-
periences related by friends or ac-
quaintances, also reinforce trust (or
distrust).
The important role of knowledge
also explains the need for openness
and honesty. Betrayal undermines
trust out of proportion to its frequen-
cy or effect on outcomes in interper-
sonal and institutional relationships.28
In all likelihood, this is a manifesta-
tion of “tip of the iceberg” thinking.
In conditions of risk, uncertainty, and
the granting of discretionary power to
another, where extensive monitoring
is impossible or unacceptably costly,
an experience of betrayal generates a
concern that there may be other, un-
known actions that are harmful or
dishonest. Betrayal is also powerful
because it causes individuals to doubt
their own capacity for wise trusting
and hence influences all of one’s trust-
based relationships. Paradoxically,
there is a propensity for individuals to
disbelieve in violations of trust. Some-
times the need to trust is so strong or
the options so few that individuals
can permit a type of cognitive disso-
nance when evaluating another indi-
vidual or organization’s behavior. This
may be less true for individual-insti-
tutional trust than for interpersonal
trust, however, because relationships
with organizations are often imper-
sonal. Hence openness and honesty
may be even more important for or-
ganizations than for interpersonal
trust relationships.
An important social condition af-
fecting trust is deterrence. The more
deterrents there are to betrayal, dis-
honesty, or incompetence, and the
more these deterrents are known by
trusters, the higher the expectation
that trust will be honored. Usually de-
terrents are formal and explicit—in
statutes, liability, and elections, for ex-
ample—but implicit deterrents such
as the threat of bad publicity also af-
fect the expectations of individuals for
beneficence, advocacy, and good out-
comes. Legislative action regarding
“gag clauses,” third party appeals
processes, and the timeliness of orga-
nizational responses to complaints
deter practices that undermine trust
and thus could strengthen (and help
justify) trust in managed care organi-
zations.
Yet another condition influencing
trust is a sense of shared values. Some-
times called “identification-based
trust,”29 the perception that a trustee
has internalized the truster’s prefer-
ences because of shared values can
produce a very powerful trust in an
individual or institution. This may
exist, for instance, in a church, or for
employees within the same firm.30 Of
course, the perception of shared val-
ues requires knowledge of those val-
ues, thus openness and honesty are
again necessary preconditions. A
sense of shared values is also affected
by perceived difference or sameness.
Women may distrust an organization
dominated by men, and minorities
may distrust an institution run by
whites. Thus while homogeneity
within an institution may strengthen
the trust of like individuals, it will
weaken the trust of those from dis-
similar groups.
A sense of shared values is also pro-
foundly affected by experiences that
reflect congruence in goals or a lack
thereof. An initial distrust produced
by dissimilarity, for instance, can
eventually be overcome if the individ-
ual sees the institution consistently
demonstrate its fidelity to trust and
act in ways that show it shares the in-
dividual’s values and goals. Shared
values are also strongly influenced by
voice—by the perception that one has
a role in organizational decisionmak-
ing.31 Organizational justice, whether
procedural or distributive, is thus an
important component of institutional
trust relationships. This element of
institutional trust has no easy parallel
with interpersonal trust-based rela-
tionships, even in the health care
arena. A fair distribution of benefits
and burdens, or a fair process of deci-
sionmaking, is more important for
organizations than for individuals be-
cause of organizational control over
pooled resources. In particular, if an
individual perceives that a distribu-
tion of benefits and burdens has not
been in her favor, her perception of
the fairness of the process or proce-
dure for distributing those benefits
and burdens becomes increasingly
important to her overall evaluation of
the organization.32 The reason that
individuals may accept, and perceive
as fair, an unfavorable distributive
outcome may be explained by the ef-
fect that their experience of the
process of decisionmaking has on
their expectations about how they
might be treated in the future. In
other words, a bad outcome this time
can be outweighed by the expectation
that, because the decisionmaking
process is fair, they are likely to be
treated fairly over the long term. It
has not been shown that this relation-
ship exists in the distribution of
health care benefits and burdens, but
there is no reason to suspect that it
would be different. Lack of knowl-
edge about the process of organiza-
tional decisionmaking, or a percep-
The important role of knowledge also explains the
need for openness and honesty. Betrayal undermines
trust out of proportion to its frequency 
or effect on outcomes.
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tion that those decisions are arbitrary,
can both make the decisions still
more unacceptable and worsen oth-
ers’ opinions of them.
Organizational Roles
Using the conceptual model oftrust, what are the roles of health
care organizations and their corre-
sponding trust objects? One role for
health care organizations is as a
provider of care; as such they are en-
trusted with the health, well-being,
treatment decisions, and private in-
formation of individual patients (and
potential patients). A commitment to
competence, beneficence, confiden-
tiality, and other values follows once
the organization has accepted this
role. Most health care organizations
also pay for health care and thus are
entrusted with pooled, limited re-
sources as well as the financial well-
being of individuals confronting ill-
ness, especially catastrophic illness.
Prudent use of resources, fidelity to
and beneficence for the very ill sub-
scriber are moral obligations that fol-
low from the “insurer” role and, in-
deed, the role of any health care orga-
nization that makes budgetary deci-
sions affecting patient care. Health
care organizations may be places
where clinicians work, and thus pa-
tients may also trust the organization
to safeguard and protect the relation-
ships, themselves trust-based, be-
tween clinicians and patients. Health
care organizations are also, of course,
employers, and thus are trusted with
employees’ livelihood and financial
security. Finally, health care organiza-
tions are often the result of social in-
vestment, whether private, public, or
philanthropic, and they are therefore
trusted with the control and prudent
use of community resources, and fre-
quently with overseeing the health of
the community.
How does this analysis of trust,
ethics, and health care organizations
help address the many thorny moral
questions facing those organizations
today? From a practical perspective,
trust and trustworthiness are familiar
concepts to individuals trained in
business or administration, although
they may more often think of trust in
their employees or of customer trust
in the organization. The recognition
that organizational morality depends
on the role of the organization in a
specific situation could illuminate
some of the hard cases by, for in-
stance, revealing conflicting roles
within a single organization's rela-
tionship to an individual. Specific
roles accepted by an organization
allow ethical priority-setting (compe-
tence for providers, fairness for pay-
ers). Since trust in an organization de-
pends on the actions of individuals in
it, and trust in individuals depends
on trust in their organization, using
trust allows micro-, meso-, and
macro-levels of analysis to interact.
Finally, for organizations desiring or
aspiring to the highest levels of identi-
fication-based trust, based on shared
values, they will need to go beyond
minimum standards of openness and
honesty and incorporate the voices of
those whose trust they seek. 
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